

POLICY REPORT



COUNTERING ANTISEMITISM IN THE VISEGRÁD COUNTRIES

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INTRODUCTION

With the goal of developing evidence-based policy recommendations, a comprehensive study was undertaken to improve understanding of the extent and causes of antisemitic prejudice in the Visegrád countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.¹

First, focus groups were conducted to explore how various types of modern antisemitism are manifested in discussions and how anti-Jewish opinions are framed, contextualized, and justified. A region-wide survey followed in June 2021. Over 2,000 adults per country were surveyed online. The survey examined the prevalence, intensity, and causes of antisemitic prejudice in each Visegrád country.

The overall level of manifest antisemitic prejudice was assessed by examining its content (the cognitive dimension), its emotional intensity (the emotive dimension), and the willingness to act upon this prejudice (the behavioural dimension).² The cognitive dimension refers to antisemitic stereotypes, ideas, and beliefs about Jews, including those associated with traditional religion-based anti-Judaism and conspiratorial antisemitism. The emotive dimension indicates the intensity of feelings towards Jews. The behavioural dimension suggests a tendency

¹ The research methods and results were published in Barna et al., *Survey on Antisemitic Prejudice in the Visegrád Countries – Research Report* (Budapest: Tom Lantos Institute, 2022). <https://tomlantosinstitute.hu/what-we-do/jewish-life-and-countering-antisemitism/publications/survey-on-antisemitic-prejudice-in-the-visegrad-countries-research-report.html>. Several parts of this report reproduce the text of the publication.

² To measure antisemitic prejudice, we used the methodology developed by the sociologist András Kovács, which has been applied in several antisemitic prejudice studies throughout Europe (Kovács 2011; Kovács and Fischer 2021).

to act on anti-Jewish prejudice, such as a readiness to engage in or accept discrimination against Jews.

Since after the Holocaust public expressions of antisemitism became increasingly unacceptable, new forms of antisemitism have emerged (Kovács 2011). Antisemitic prejudices are often expressed indirectly in relation to the Holocaust and Israel. The study, therefore, also examined Holocaust-related antisemitism (secondary antisemitism) and anti-Jewish hatred directed at Israel (new antisemitism). Due to the strong social and political taboo associated with the open expression of antisemitism, the issue of latency pressure was also examined.

The survey also sought to identify factors that cause antisemitic prejudice, and which social groups are prone to such prejudice. The following factors were investigated: gender, age, educational level, settlement size, socio-economic status, religiosity, law-and-order conservatism, political orientation, general prejudice, and nationalist and populist attitudes. To understand regional specificities better, the relationship between antisemitism and perceptions of collective victimhood and historical responsibility regarding the Holocaust were also explored.

Following the conclusion of the research, an international conference and country-level policy workshops were organized to discuss the research findings and formulate recommendations for countering antisemitism in three key policy areas: equality, education, and remembrance. This report presents the key research findings and policy recommendations developed by local experts. The recommendations primarily draw on research findings and are informed by the discussions at the academic and country policy workshops. They also draw on the experts' understanding of the local social and political context and their knowledge of the specific ways in which antisemitism manifests itself in the four Visegrád countries.

KEY FINDINGS

Focus group research

Although the results of focus groups cannot be generalized, certain trends did emerge even from a limited number of focus groups. A key finding of the online focus groups was the rare occurrence of spontaneous antisemitic remarks in the discussions in the four Visegrád countries. Also notable was the lack of hard-core Holocaust denial in the discussions. Despite the rarity of spontaneous antisemitic statements, certain topics, such as Holocaust remembrance and education and issues of

WHILE SPONTANEOUS ANTISEMITIC REMARKS WERE RARE, CERTAIN TOPICS, INCLUDING HOLOCAUST REMEMBRANCE AND EDUCATION AND QUESTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY, EVOKED A RELATIVELY LARGE NUMBER OF ANTI-JEWISH REMARKS

responsibility, elicited a relatively large number of anti-Jewish remarks in the online focus groups. In addition, the susceptibility to antisemitic content was often high in all four Visegrád countries. An important aspect of this was the participants' acceptance of antisemitic stereotypes and narratives, especially those in which antisemitism focused on Israel was reinforced through Holocaust distortion.³ Furthermore, in all four countries, conspiratorial, secondary, and new antisemitism were frequently expressed simultaneously in entangled narratives that reinforced each other.

*SUSCEPTIBILITY TO ANTISEMITIC CONTENT WAS
OFTEN HIGH*

Focus-group discussions confirmed the widely accepted phenomenon that feelings of powerlessness can increase susceptibility to conspiracy theories.

Participants in all four Visegrád countries who expressed a sense of powerlessness as individuals or at the national level were more inclined to believe in conspiracies. The majority of participants also believed in secret organizations. Often, the descriptions of these organizations resembled those portrayed in antisemitic arguments. The participants generally believed that certain groups and individuals have access to too much power and that the primary sources of this power are money, wealth, and networks. Although participants rarely mentioned Jews explicitly, they used stereotypes associated with Jews to describe those with too much power, including the characteristics selfish, greedy, and rapacious. Proponents of Jewish conspiracy theories contend that these characteristics make Jews capable of and willing to weave global conspiracies.

Besides the key findings outlined above, some general observations concerning the focus group discussions can be made. There was a lack of knowledge among participants about Jews, Jewish culture and history, the Holocaust, Zionism, the history of Israel, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the various forms of antisemitism. There was also a lack of open disagreement with antisemitic comments during the discussions. Antisemitic statements were not countered by even those who appeared not to harbour antisemitic attitudes. Furthermore, focus groups conducted in all four counties revealed the presence of some latency pressure among respondents: they perceived it as risky to express anti-Jewish views. Many of them claimed that people generally refrain from expressing opinions regarding Jews.


³ The section associated with this topic contained some content explicitly linking contemporary Israeli policy to the Holocaust. The results therefore cannot be interpreted as measuring the extent of antisemitic attitudes among participants. They only indicate strong susceptibility to antisemitic content.

Survey⁴

BASED ON POLLING OVER 2,000 RESPONDENTS IN EACH OF THE VISEGRÁD COUNTRIES, THE ONLINE SURVEY DEMONSTRATED THAT ANTISEMITIC PREJUDICE IS PREVALENT IN THE REGION

TRADITIONAL RELIGION-BASED ANTI-JUDAISM

In the various Visegrád countries, between 39 and 51 per cent of respondents held antisemitic views associated with religious anti-Judaism. The highest rate of traditional anti-Judaism was found in Slovakia (51%), followed by Poland (45%), Hungary (40%), and the Czech Republic (39%). The proportion of respondents classified as strongly antisemitic was smallest in the Czech Republic (4%) and largest in Slovakia (10%). Hungary had the smallest (31%), and Slovakia the largest share of moderately antisemitic respondents (41%).




The distribution includes only those respondents who could be classified.

CONSPIRATORIAL ANTISEMITISM

In the four countries, between 53 and 71 per cent of the respondents believed in conspiracy theories about Jews, such as the existence of a secret Jewish network that influences global politics and the economy. Conspiratorial antisemitism was most prevalent among respondents

⁴ The data was collected via online access panels using standard questionnaires. Online surveys can only aspire to be representative of the internet user population. The sample accordingly deviated from national demographic data in two respects: respondents were younger than average, and of higher socio-economic status. Compared to surveys based on face-to-face interviews, our results indicate lower levels of antisemitism in all four countries (for comparison, see Kovács and Fischer 2021). This was consistent across all types of antisemitism. In fact, the cross-country comparisons revealed similar patterns to those found in face-to-face surveys. Hungarian, Polish and Slovak respondents were significantly more antisemitic than Czechs. Moreover, the relationships between variables were in line with previously measured trends.

in Poland (71%) and Slovakia (67%), closely followed by Hungary (62%). It was less prevalent among Czech respondents (53%).




The proportion of respondents classified as strongly antisemitic was smallest in the Czech Republic (6%) and largest in Hungary and Poland (23% for both). Hungary had the smallest share of moderately antisemitic respondents (39%) and Slovakia and Poland the largest (48%).

The distribution includes only those respondents who could be classified.

BEHAVIOURAL ANTISEMITISM

Across the Visegrád countries, between 28 and 47 per cent of respondents stated that they were willing to engage in or accept discrimination against Jews. Behavioural antisemitism was strongest among Polish respondents (47%), followed closely by Slovakian respondents (43%) and then by Hungarian (35%) and Czech respondents (28%). The proportion of strongly antisemitic respondents was the smallest also in the Czech Republic (2%), while it was the largest in Poland (9%). The proportion of moderately antisemitic respondents was the same in the Czech Republic and Hungary (26%) and it was relatively larger in Slovakia (36%) and Poland (38%).




The proportion of strongly antisemitic respondents was the smallest also in the Czech Republic (2%), while it was the largest in Poland (9%). The proportion of moderately antisemitic respondents was the same in the Czech Republic and Hungary (26%) and it was relatively larger in Slovakia (36%) and Poland (38%).

The distribution includes only those respondents who could be classified.

ACROSS THE FOUR COUNTRIES, BETWEEN 29 AND 47 PER CENT OF THE RESPONDENTS STATED THEY WERE WILLING TO ENGAGE IN OR ACCEPT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST JEWS

OVERALL COGNITIVE ANTISEMITISM


Examining traditional religious anti-Judaism, conspiratorial antisemitism, and behavioural antisemitism together, we found that between 36 and 59 per cent of the respondents can be considered as cognitive antisemites. Cognitive antisemitism was most prevalent among Polish respondents (59%), closely followed by Slovakian respondents (56%), and then by Hungarian (49%) and Czech respondents (36%). The proportion of respondents classified as strongly antisemitic was the smallest in the Czech Republic (2%) and the largest in Poland (14%). The proportion of moderately antisemitic respondents was also smallest in the Czech Republic (34%) and largest in Slovakia (46%).



The distribution includes only those respondents who could be classified.

EMOTIVE ANTISEMITISM

Across the Visegrád countries, between 22 and 25 per cent of respondents expressed negative feelings towards Jews. Emotive antisemitism was most prevalent among Polish respondents (25%) followed closely by Slovakian respondents (24%) and it was least prevalent among Czech and Hungarian respondents (both at 22%). The proportion of strongly antisemitic respondents was the smallest in the Czech Republic (9%) and equally large in Poland and Slovakia (14%). The share of moderately antisemitic respondents was slightly smaller in Hungary (9%) than in the other Visegrád countries (10–13%). The proportion of cognitive antisemites is larger than




the proportion of those who admitted to disliking Jews, thus respondents who accept prevalent antisemitic ideas are not necessarily hostile to Jews. This indicates that accepting negative antisemitic stereotypes can also be a part of social knowledge without being associated with negative emotions about Jews.

The distribution includes only those respondents who could be classified.

RESPONDENTS WHO ACCEPT PREVALENT ANTISEMITIC STEREOTYPES ARE NOT NECESSARILY HOSTILE TO JEWS, INDICATING THAT ANTI-JEWISH STEREOTYPES CAN ALSO BE PART OF SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE WITHOUT NEGATIVE FEELINGS BEING ATTACHED TO THEM

OVERALL MANIFEST ANTI-SEMITISM

Examining the cognitive, behavioural, and emotional dimensions together, 6 to 16 per cent of respondents can be classified as strongly antisemitic, and 12 to 20 per cent as moderately antisemitic across the four countries. Overall manifest antisemitism was strongest in Poland and Slovakia (33%), followed by Hungary (27%) and then by the Czech Republic (25%).



Among the four countries, the Czech Republic had the smallest (6%) and Poland the largest proportion of strongly antisemitic respondents (16%). Hungary had the smallest (12%) and Slovakia the largest proportion of moderately antisemitic respondents (20%).

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
HOLOCAUST-RELATED (SECONDARY) ANTI-SEMITISM

Survey questions also examined antisemitic prejudice expressed in opinions about the Holocaust.

Nearly 40 per cent of the Czech respondents and around 50 per cent of the Slovakian,

NEARLY 40 PER CENT OF THE CZECH RESPONDENTS AND AROUND 50 PER CENT OF THE SLOVAKIAN, POLISH, AND HUNGARIAN RESPONDENTS DENIED OR RELATIVIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE HOLOCAUST AND HOLOCAUST REMEMBRANCE

Polish, and Hungarian respondents denied or relativized the importance of the Holocaust and Holocaust remembrance. Secondary antisemitism and Holocaust distortion were most prevalent in Poland (53%) and Hungary (52%), followed by Slovakia (49%) and then the Czech Republic (38%). Czech respondents were also the least likely to be prone to strong antisemitic prejudice




(2%), compared to respondents of other Visegrád countries, where this share ranged from 7 to 12 per cent. The proportion of moderately antisemitic respondents was also smallest in the Czech Republic (36%) and largest in Poland (46%).

The distribution includes only those respondents who could be classified.

ISRAEL-RELATED (NEW) ANTISEMITISM

The non-response rate was relatively high for new antisemitism, resulting in a large proportion of non-classifiable respondents.⁵ Due to the potential lack of knowledge behind the non-responses, direct comparisons between countries are not possible. It could be only concluded that 52 per cent of respondents in the Czech Republic, 49 per cent in Hungary, 71 per cent in Poland, and 58 per cent in Slovakia expressed hostility towards Israel.




The distribution shows all responses.

LATENCY PRESSURE

Considering that the open expression of antisemitism is regarded as a strong social and political taboo, the latency pressure respondents felt regarding expressing their anti-Jewish feelings was also measured. Hungarian respondents were most likely to perceive high latency pressure (35%).

⁵ This proportion was the largest in Slovakia (28%), closely followed by Hungary (27%), and then by the Czech Republic and Poland with the same rate (13%).



This was followed by the Czech Republic (26%), Slovakia (21%), and Poland (20%). The proportion of respondents who perceive medium-level latency pressure was relatively similar among all four countries, ranging between 35 and 42 per cent.

The distribution includes only those respondents who could be classified.

CAUSES OF ANTISEMITIC PREJUDICE

We sought to identify the factors determining the prevalence and intensity of antisemitism and the social groups most susceptible to prejudice. Empirical studies have established a link between antisemitic prejudice and various socio-demographic and attitudinal factors. We examined the following factors: gender, age, educational level, settlement size, socioeconomic status, religiousness, law-and-order conservatism, political orientation, general prejudice, and nationalist and populist attitudes. Across all four Visegrád countries, and for nearly all types of antisemitism, general prejudice and populist attitudes⁶ had the strongest effects. Those who tended to be more prejudiced against other groups and more populist were more likely to be antisemitic. However, general prejudice did not affect Israel-focused new antisemitism among Czech respondents. In the case of Czech and Slovak respondents, the effect of populism was weaker on new antisemitism. Respondents with a left-wing political orientation in these two

GENDER, AGE, EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, SETTLEMENT SIZE, SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND RELIGIOUSITY HAD ONLY A WEAK EFFECT ON WHETHER RESPONDENTS WERE ANTISEMITIC

countries were more likely to hold antisemitic views directed at Israel. In contrast, political orientation in the Czech Republic plays no role in manifest antisemitism or Holocaust-related secondary antisemitism. In Hungary and Poland, right-wingers were more susceptible to all forms of antisemitism. Across the four countries, nationalistic respondents were more likely to be

⁶ Populist attitudes are characterized by anti-elitism, scepticism of parliamentary democracy, and a desire for grass-roots decision-making (Kovács and Fischer 2021). They are generally associated with radical left-wing and right-wing movements.

antisemitic since they were also more populist. Law-and-order conservatism is also closely associated with antisemitism. However, respondents who hold such attitudes tend to be characterized by general prejudice and populism, which explains much of their tendency to be antisemitic.

Socio-demographic characteristics and religiosity are not significant determinants of antisemitism in any Visegrád country. There were a few exceptions, but their effects were minor. Male Hungarian and Polish respondents were more likely to deny and distort the Holocaust than women. In the Czech Republic, women were more likely to harbour Israel-focused antisemitic views, while in Hungary and Poland the younger generation was more prone to this type of antisemitism. In the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia, individuals with lower social status were slightly more likely to deny and distort the Holocaust. Settlement size also affected manifest antisemitism in Poland. Overall, socio-demographic variables had the most significant impact on antisemitism in Slovakia.

REGIONAL SPECIFICITIES

To better understand regional specificities concerning antisemitism, we examined the relationship between antisemitism and victimhood narratives and historical perceptions about responsibility for the Holocaust. We looked at two forms of collective victimhood: exclusive and inclusive victim consciousness. The former emphasizes the uniqueness of one’s own nation’s suffering, whereas the latter emphasizes similarities, and views the

THE PERCEPTION OF RESPONDENTS THAT THEIR NATION WAS A UNIQUE VICTIM OF HISTORY, OR THAT THE INHABITANTS THEREOF HAD SUFFERED AS MUCH AS JEWS DURING WORLD WAR II CORRELATED WITH ANTISEMITISM AND HOLOCAUST DISTORTION

former as akin to the suffering of other groups (Vollhardt 2012). In all Visegrád countries, respondents who believed that their nation was a unique victim of history were strongly predisposed to antisemitism. We also found that those with stronger exclusive victim consciousness were more likely to be characterized by competitive victimhood – a tendency to see one’s own group as having been subjected to more injustice than other social groups. Additionally, in all four countries, respondents’ perception that the inhabitants of their nation had suffered as much as Jews during World War II correlated with antisemitic attitudes. The strongest association was found among the Hungarian respondents and the weakest among the Polish respondents.

Respondents' views of how their societies had treated Jews during the Holocaust, which ranged from saving Jews to actively participating in the Holocaust, also correlated with antisemitism and Holocaust distortion, with significant country-level differences. Those Czechs who believed that their society had treated Jews *negatively* were more likely

RESPONDENTS' VIEWS OF HOW THEIR SOCIETIES HAD TREATED JEWS DURING THE HOLOCAUST ALSO CORRELATED WITH ANTISEMITISM, WITH SIGNIFICANT COUNTRY DIFFERENCES

to be antisemitic or to distort the Holocaust. In contrast, those Hungarians who believed that their society had treated Jews *positively* were more likely to be antisemitic or to distort the Holocaust. In Poland, both positive and negative perceptions correlated with stronger antisemitism, while in Slovakia these factors did not correlate with antisemitic views.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the survey results and input from country policy workshops, recommendations for countering antisemitism in the Visegrád countries were developed in three policy areas: equality, education, and remembrance. As a first step in the process, local experts developed country-specific recommendations. However, since the majority of these recommendations revealed clear regional trends, most country-specific recommendations were reformulated as regional recommendations. These regional recommendations are presented in this report.

General Remarks

Antisemitism is a complex phenomenon, and its definition is a subject of debate in academic circles and among the general public. Policy measures aimed at countering antisemitism require proper monitoring and analysis, which must be based on a solid operational definition. The IHRA Working Definition on Antisemitism (IHRA definition), along with its guiding examples⁷ – endorsed by all four Visegrád countries – is a positive development in this regard. Still, its limitations need to be considered. The IHRA definition was intended to serve as a reference

⁷ The definition states: "Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities". To provide a better understanding of antisemitism, the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism includes eleven examples of how antisemitism can be manifest.

point for educational and assessment purposes. It is a tool that governments, public institutions, and civil society groups can use to illustrate and help identify expressions associated with classical stereotypes about Jews suitable for expressing anti-Jewish hatred as well as contemporary forms of antisemitism. The IHRA definition is a non-legal tool and as such is it not suitable for use in a legal instrument due to its lack of precision, among other reasons. Neither should it be used to create new categories of prohibited antisemitic speech subject to criminal and civil penalties. The IHRA definition must be applied carefully and appropriately to ensure that existing rights, including freedom of expression, are protected and not undermined.

The governments and civil society actors of Visegrád countries should widely disseminate and promote the use of the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism, particularly in the areas of data collection, education, and awareness-raising, as a non-legal tool that can help identify and illustrate antisemitic expressions, while acknowledging its limitations. The IHRA definition must be applied carefully and appropriately to ensure that existing rights, including freedom of expression, are protected and not undermined.

In addition, as noted in the IHRA definition itself, the complementary list of examples provided with the definition is illustrative and not exhaustive, and the overall context should be taken into account when making an assessment.

Efforts to counter antisemitism are often based on governments' general efforts to combat racism and xenophobia, and other forms of group-focused enmity (Zick et al. 2008). While antisemitic prejudice is

part of a broader spectrum of prejudices directed at various outgroups and shares a number of similarities with other group-focused enmities, it also has unique characteristics. One of its distinguishing characteristics is its long history and ability to take different forms and fulfil different functions over time. Anti-Jewish prejudice is often associated with conspiracy theories that claim that Jews have sinister intentions and hidden powers. Antisemitism also differs from other prejudices that portray the "other" as fundamentally inferior. In contrast, antisemitism is directed upwards. It is often based on the belief that Jews possess extraordinary and superior political and economic power that is used to oppress non-Jews. In addition, antisemitism goes beyond personal attitudes or prejudices against Jews to encompass a variety of social and cultural practices that often culminate in a conscious, crystallized worldview (Bergmann 2009).

Antisemitism has a unique nature, which calls for specific measures and resources to combat this particular form of hatred. Therefore, it is recommended that national coordinators for combatting antisemitism be appointed to supervise and coordinate the relevant activities of government ministries, departments, agencies, and public bodies and to cooperate with Jewish communities and relevant civil society actors. National coordinators should be selected from the most qualified and independent antisemitism experts by a selection committee consisting of

Jewish organizations, government officials, representatives of relevant public institutions, and experts in the field. States should provide national coordinators with sufficient financial and human resources to enable them to undertake their duties effectively. The government should facilitate the participation of a wide range of actors from different sectors of society to combat antisemitism. Based on a broad consensus among these stakeholders, and in consultation with the Jewish community, the national coordinators should lead the development, adoption, implementation, and evaluation of targeted measures and national strategies to combat antisemitism in all its forms.

Antisemitism has a unique nature, which calls for specific measures and resources to combat this particular form of hatred. National coordinators should be appointed to oversee and supervise efforts to combat antisemitism. Targeted measures and national action plans to combat different forms of antisemitism should be developed, implemented and evaluated with the involvement of a wide variety of stakeholders, including the Jewish community.

Generally, policy measures in the Visegrád region concentrate on combatting antisemitic hate speech, including Holocaust denial and antisemitic hate crimes and incidents. However, this approach overlooks several crucial factors. Although antisemitic prejudice is widespread in the four Visegrád countries, the number and intensity of violent antisemitic attacks is relatively low compared to in Western Europe. Hard-core Holocaust denial is also rare. This conclusion was also supported by findings of the focus groups, in which hard-core Holocaust denial – i.e. the

Measures addressing antisemitic acts and speech are important for countering antisemitism that is manifested at the level of the individual, but educational tools are essential to building societies' resilience to antisemitism.

rejection of the historical truth of the Holocaust – was absent from the discussions in all countries, and participants found claims of hard-core Holocaust denial to be absurd and unacceptable. Moreover, direct expressions of antisemitic attitudes through public statements or acts are generally considered to be taboo

according to prevailing social norms, so they are typically expressed in private or semi-private interactions or in more subtle forms (Kovács 2011). Antisemitic remarks are often accompanied by efforts to conceal or deny their antisemitic nature. This often results in heated debate regarding what constitutes an antisemitic statement.

Another important issue pertains to the peculiar character of antisemitism – namely, that it can assume different forms and fulfil different functions at different levels of society. Antisemitism

can function as a cultural code within a society for interpreting social, political, economic, and cultural issues that do not directly relate to the role and place of Jews in society, but which are difficult to comprehend (Ibid.). Key aspects of this function often include the diabolization of Jews and the conspiratorial nature of antisemitism. Jews can take on the form of any enemy required by a specific victim; a phenomenon known as the chameleon effect (Bronner 2003). As the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance noted Jews are often demonized in line with aspects of their presumed identity, including social status (e.g., rich), professional background (e.g., banking) and political ideology (e.g., communist, liberal, cosmopolitan, Zionist). This serves to create the necessary nexus for feeding pertinent conspiracy theories at any given time (ECRI, 2021). Thus, Jews, or those perceived to be Jewish, are often blamed for economic and political hardship, misfortune, and political upheaval and societal tensions. Policy measures focusing on non-discrimination fail to adequately capture this element. While measures that address antisemitic acts and speech are crucial for countering antisemitism that is manifested at the level of the individual, educational tools are essential for building societies resilience to antisemitism.

Equality

It is important to distinguish between individual antisemitic prejudices and antisemitism manifested in action. Indeed, there is no direct link between antisemitic prejudice and the likelihood of discrimination or violence against Jews. Antisemitic violence can be negligible in societies where anti-Jewish prejudice is prevalent (Kovács and Fischer 2021). Accordingly, this study, which focuses on antisemitic prejudice, cannot be used to draw any conclusions about the level of anti-Jewish violence in the countries under examination. Nevertheless, individuals who harbour antisemitic prejudices, even if they do not commit antisemitic acts themselves, may accept or at least not strongly condemn such acts, thus fostering an environment in which antisemitic acts or even violence are acceptable (Ibid.) Across the Visegrád countries, between 28 and 47 per cent of survey respondents stated that they were willing to engage in or accept discrimination against Jews. Although antisemitic acts were not the subject of the study, for the reasons outlined above, recommendations were also formulated to combat antisemitic hate crimes and antisemitic speech, including cyber-antisemitism.

An antisemitic hate crime is an attack or threat against people or property because of their actual or perceived Jewish identity or origin or association with Jewish individuals or communities. Such crimes are a reminder of the persistence and pervasiveness of antisemitism in a given society. As hate crimes are motivated by bias, they also violate the human rights principles of equality and dignity for all. Antisemitic offences convey a message of hatred and exclusion to Jewish individuals and communities and generate a sense of fear and insecurity

on an individual and community level. Addition to protection against hate crimes, states should also provide protection against direct and indirect discrimination, harassment, and instruction to discriminate based on the grounds of a person's, or group of persons', Jewish identity or origin.

Language, images, and other non-verbal forms of expression can also express antisemitic prejudice. Antisemitic speech can take many forms. Antisemitism may be expressed orally, in writing, on the internet, through social media, or in non-verbal form, such as in the display of antisemitic symbols. Antisemitic language may also be used indirectly in order to conceal its target or intentions. According to international human rights law, antisemitic speech can be divided into three categories: 1) expressions constituting crimes; 2) expressions that may justify civil action or administrative sanction but are not criminal offences; and, 3) expressions that do not merit criminal, civil, or administrative sanctions, but nevertheless raise concerns regarding tolerance, civility, and respect for other people's rights (Articles 19.3 and 20.2 of the ICCPR, Article 4 of the ICERD).⁸ Public incitement to discrimination, violence, or hatred against a person or a group of persons on the grounds of their Jewish identity or origin should be offences punishable by law (Article 4 of the ICERD). This can include intentional public condoning, denial, and justification of the Holocaust when they clearly amount to incitement to hatred or discrimination (General recommendation No. 35 of the ICERD). Other forms of illegal antisemitic

Punishment for antisemitic hate crimes and sanctions for prohibited speech or discriminative acts have symbolic significance, as they convey the message that such behaviour is unacceptable. But if hate crime, hate speech laws and anti-discrimination laws are not implemented effectively, they may undermine efforts to combat antisemitism and the public's understanding of its harmful effects.

⁸ ICCPR Article 19.3 states: "The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals." ICCPR Article 20.2 states: "Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law." ICERD Article 4 states: "States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention, inter alia: (a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof; (b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law; (c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination."

speech include advocacy of antisemitic ideas based on racial or ethnic superiority or hatred, and the expression of insults, ridicule, or slander of persons or groups or the justification of hatred, contempt, or discrimination of persons on the grounds of their actual or perceived Jewish identity or origin, when this clearly amounts to incitement to hatred or discrimination (Article 4 of the ICERD). In addition, participation in organizations and activities which promote and incite racial discrimination, violence, or hatred against a person or a group of persons on the grounds of their Jewish identity or origin also must be prohibited (Ibid.)

The punishment of antisemitic hate crimes and the enforcement of legal responsibility for prohibited hate speech and discrimination have also symbolic significance since they convey a message that such behaviour is unacceptable. However, if hate crime, hate speech, and anti-discrimination laws are not implemented effectively, they may undermine efforts to combat antisemitism and the public's understanding of its harmful effects. In general, the effective implementation of penal code provisions is achieved through investigations of offences and, when appropriate, the prosecution of offenders, while illegal but non-criminal behaviour necessitates civil or administrative sanction. Increasing victim protection and providing support for victims of antisemitic acts are also essential for effective implementation. Many antisemitic incidents are not reported because of the victims' fear or shame. Various factors may prevent victims of antisemitic acts from exercising their right to redress through legal and administrative proceedings.

The spread of antisemitic speech and ideas, including anti-Jewish conspiracy theories, through social media platforms and instant messaging applications raises particular concern as this can create fertile ground for hatred. Since online interactions can be conducted anonymously, online antisemitic expression is less characterized by latency, and it is difficult to hold people accountable for their comments. Moreover, through content-sharing on social media, hateful language is easily replicated and amplified, perpetuating negative antisemitic stereotypes. For instance, studies have shown that approximately 97% of all antisemitic expressions in the Czech Republic are made online (FRA, 2021).

Although direct offline and online incitement to violence, hatred, and discrimination against Jews is easy to detect, it may not be the most concerning form of antisemitic speech. As it is explicit, direct incitement can be challenged and countered. But more subtle, implicit forms of antisemitic prejudice are also manifested through language. Antisemitism appears in different forms, including reference to classical Jewish stereotypes as well as new forms of antisemitism. It can be expressed not only directly and openly but also in a more covert or coded manner. It may be intentional or unintentional. Consequently, it is difficult to determine whether a statement or action is antisemitic. Context is often a key factor, and every case must be evaluated individually, exercising judgment and sensitivity. To make such an assessment, it is

necessary to better understand antisemitism, the different societal and political functions it fulfils, and its different forms.

Research findings highlight the particular importance of countering antisemitic speech. The susceptibility of focus group participants to antisemitic content was often high in all four Visegrád countries. Nevertheless, survey results indicating that negative antisemitic stereotypes are part of social knowledge might suggest that alternative non-censorial measures, such as counter-speech

Research results indicating that negative antisemitic stereotypes are part of social knowledge might suggest that counter-speech that directly refutes hate messages, awareness-raising regarding antisemitic stereotypes, and proactive educational campaigns are more likely to prove effective at countering antisemitic speech than laws prohibiting hate speech.

that directly refutes antisemitic messages, awareness-raising regarding antisemitic stereotypes, and proactive educational campaigns, are more likely to prove effective at ultimately eradicating antisemitic speech and its potentially harmful effects than laws prohibiting hate speech. The media can also play a crucial role by portraying Jews in a manner that demonstrates respect and fairness, avoids stereotyping, and by reporting on Israeli events in a way that does not promote antisemitic stereotypes.

Therefore, it is recommended that:

- **Ministries of Justice, the Offices of the General Prosecutor and professional associations for judges should provide formal and regular comprehensive training programmes for police officers, prosecutors, the judiciary, the staff of National Human Rights Institutions, and relevant civil society organizations, as well as private actors such as social media platforms that are involved in monitoring, preventing, and combating antisemitism. Such programmes should go beyond general instructions about reporting and recording antisemitic hate speech and bias-motivated crimes and implementing Holocaust denial laws. Information should also be provided about relevant international human rights law, including the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. The training programmes should also include sessions focused on the history of antisemitism, its societal and political functions, and its traditional and contemporary forms to equip the former actors with the skills necessary to identify antisemitic statements and acts, particularly when antisemitism is expressed covertly.**

- To prevent antisemitic hate crimes, hate speech, and discrimination from becoming widespread, law enforcement agencies and prosecutors should collaborate closely with Jewish organizations and other civil society actors to identify, document, investigate, and, if necessary, sanction or prosecute those responsible, in line with international human rights standards. It is crucial to ensure that members of the Jewish community are involved in analyzing the contexts and content of antisemitic speech and identifying effective methods of combating it, as well as tools for counteracting its harmful effects.
- Public authorities should make systematic efforts to disband organizations that advocate antisemitic hatred and cease providing financial and other forms of support from the state budget to such organizations, including political parties, in accordance with international humanitarian law.
- To reduce underreporting of antisemitic crimes and prohibited speech, public authorities should ensure that victims of antisemitic acts are aware of their right to redress and are not prevented from exercising this right due to fear, insufficient knowledge, physical or psychological obstacles, or lack of means. Public authorities should provide victims with adequate support, including legal assistance and psychological counselling, before, during, and after such proceedings. Collaboration with non-governmental organizations, including Jewish organizations, should be strengthened to provide victim support. A victim-centred approach should be employed that recognizes and values victims' perceptions and experience, and gives special consideration to victims' rights and needs.
- The Jewish community and civil society organizations should consider engaging in public interest strategic litigation to ensure that individuals and groups responsible for committing antisemitic hate crimes and engaging in illegal antisemitic speech are held accountable, in accordance with international human rights standards.
- Relevant public bodies responsible for broadcasting and media ethics, and, in cases of incitement, to violence and discrimination, the Office of the Prosecutor General, should take appropriate and swift action if antisemitic content appears in public (national), state-sponsored and state-controlled media (TV channels, radio, online channels).
- With regard to online antisemitic speech, a multi-stakeholder model must be adopted that includes public and private authorities, regulatory bodies and

internet and technology companies, as well as Jewish representatives, in order to develop a comprehensive regulatory and policy framework that includes a variety of differentiated and complementary strategies that effectively combat antisemitic speech in its various forms. A comprehensive approach should encompass both civil and criminal law measures as well as information, education, and cultural measures.

- Research should be conducted to determine how and to what extent antisemitism may be expressed on the internet. More specifically, systematic data collection and analysis are necessary for assessing the circumstances in which antisemitic speech emerges, the audiences it reaches or targets, the channels of communication employed, and the responses of social media platforms to antisemitic messages.
- Since law enforcement agencies lack the capacity to monitor the internet on an ongoing basis, it is vital that civil society and other actors monitor antisemitic speech and acts on the internet and social media platforms, including comments sections. Human rights organizations, civil society, social media companies and other stakeholders should build and strengthen partnerships with each other and with Jewish communities in this regard. National Human Rights Institutions should ensure coordination between the representatives of the state, the Jewish community, and civil society, as well as social media companies and internet providers (including cooperation on a European level) to monitor content and, if needed, take down and block manifestly antisemitic speech and Holocaust denial, in line with international human rights standards.
- Social media companies should put human rights at the centre of their content moderation policies and practices, as well as oversight mechanisms. Fact-checkers and content moderators should be educated about antisemitism. Internet service providers must remove illegal antisemitic hate speech promptly and consistently, in accordance with the relevant domestic laws and international human rights standards.
- The states should set up a public monitoring mechanism for identifying and monitoring antisemitic content that is disseminated in media, including social media. For such a mechanism to function effectively, states should establish a legal framework that can support the functioning of the former and select its members based on their expertise in the field. In addition, states must ensure that the necessary financial and human resources are available to support such a mechanism.

- **State and public institutions, in particular those involved in education and outreach to youth, should produce content that is also sharable via media, including social media, which demonstrates the detrimental effect of offline and online antisemitism.**
- **Civil society should also play an essential role in combating antisemitism online by providing counter-narratives to antisemitism on social networks and creating proactive educational campaigns, thereby countering antisemitic content.**
- **Both state and civil society actors should implement awareness-raising social media campaigns about the different types of antisemitism and their harmful effect on victims and on society as a whole.**
- **High-level state officials, civil society organizations, the Jewish community, and influential members of society, including, among others, opinion leaders, intellectuals, journalists, and artists, should voice their strong and open opposition to all acts and forms of antisemitism to help mobilize public opinion against antisemitic views and acts.**

Education and Remembrance

EDUCATION ABOUT JEWISH LIFE, ANTISEMITISM, AND GENERAL PREJUDICE

Survey results indicate that individuals who are prejudiced against other social groups are more likely to harbour antisemitic attitudes as well. In fact, general prejudice is one of the most influential explanatory factors in all Visegrád countries for almost all types of antisemitism. The only exception is the Czech Republic, where prejudice against other groups does not affect Israel-focused antisemitism.

Education is an important tool for building society's resilience against antisemitism and other forms of prejudice. People often hold oversimplified views about Jews and Judaism. It was apparent from the focus group discussions that participants generally had insufficient knowledge of Jewish culture and history. Such a lack of knowledge can increase the likelihood of reliance on stereotypes and the development of anti-Jewish prejudice. It can also

To counter antisemitism, it is important to promote knowledge of Jewish culture, history, diversity, and Jewish participation in and positive contributions to society.

increase the susceptibility of individuals to antisemitic content. To counter hostility toward Jews, it is important to disseminate knowledge of Jewish culture, history, diversity, and Jewish participation in and positive contributions to society, as well as to promote intercultural dialogue through education.

Most stereotypes are learned through socialization. Survey results show that the proportion of those who agree with antisemitic stereotypes is larger than that of those who admit to disliking

Anti-Jewish stereotypes are learned through socialization, but it is also possible to teach members to recognize antisemitic stereotypes, different forms of antisemitism, as well as their social and political functions and how to respond appropriately to them.

Jews. This result suggests that accepting negative antisemitic stereotypes is part of social knowledge. Although prejudice is primarily learned, it is also possible to teach members of society to recognize when they or others are using stereotypes or behaving in a prejudicial manner. Further, they can be taught to recognize specific antisemitic

stereotypes, different forms of antisemitism, as well as their social and political functions and how to respond appropriately to them.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

Education that addresses antisemitism and other types of group-focused enmity should explore the impact of harmful stereotypes on individuals and their rights and stress the importance of collective responsibility for combating stereotypes, prejudice, and discriminatory behaviour. Education that addresses antisemitism necessitates a human-rights-based approach, which acknowledges that antisemitism and other forms of group-focused enmity undermine and violate basic human rights principles.

Education that addresses antisemitism necessitates a human rights-based approach, which acknowledges that antisemitism and other forms of group-focused enmity undermine and violate basic human rights principles.

Using human rights education as an approach to countering antisemitism involves providing 1) education *about* human rights, including minority rights; 2) education *through* human rights that ensures that educational settings respect the human rights of learners; and, 3) education *for* human rights, which empowers students to exercise their rights and to promote and defend the rights of others (UNESCO and OSCE/ODHIR, 2018).

Anti-Jewish prejudice is often associated with conspiracy theories that claim Jews possess sinister intentions and hidden powers. In the four countries, between 53 and 71 per cent of

respondents believed in conspiracy theories about Jews. The internet has provided conspiracy theories, including antisemitic conspiracy theories, with increased reach and “legitimacy”. People are attracted to conspiracy theories for a variety of reasons. When faced with complex situations in which people feel powerless, conspiracy theories are sometimes invoked as a means of evading personal responsibility. Across all four Visegrád countries, participants who expressed feelings of powerlessness as individuals or at the national level were more likely to believe in conspiracies. Generally, participants believed that secret organizations existed. The descriptions of these organizations often resembled those depicted in antisemitic arguments.

Media and information literacy is crucial for helping students become more resilient to the simplistic explanations provided by conspiracy theories about Jews.

Education about conspiracy theories is important for understanding and addressing antisemitism. Media and information literacy should also be taught to students to help them recognize and reject antisemitic representations and become more resilient to simplistic explanations provided by conspiracy theories. Learners should be able to identify antisemitic representations, extremist claims, and conspiracy theories or calls to reject

human rights values, even when presented with emotional imagery or references to suffering (UNESCO and OSCE, 2018).

Countering antisemitism necessitates not only building resilience against antisemitic content, but also creating conditions for challenging such narratives. It was apparent from the focus group research that when antisemitic statements arose, they were typically met with indifference and silence from other participants. Educational approaches that build self-confidence and a sense of agency are necessary for standing up against antisemitism. These include efforts to promote citizenship education – particularly the promotion of a sense of solidarity and social responsibility, community involvement, the development of a debate culture, and the ability to engage in difficult discussions.

Citizenship education should not only emphasize passive but also active citizenship. Passive citizenship involves observing social rules, respecting human values, undertaking societal responsibilities, and understanding formal democratic principles. Active citizenship, on the other hand, involves citizens who are active and dynamic and are capable of engaging critically with social issues and attempting to influence them (Pagliarello et al. 2021). It is essential that citizenship education not only provides students with the fundamentals of political literacy, but also with specific skills related to active citizenship, community involvement, and social responsibility (Ibid.). This involves encouraging the active participation of students in school life, as well as their involvement in the greater local community, as fundamental learning experiences related to civic education (Ibid.). This is particularly important in the Visegrád

region, where the teaching process focuses on transmitting knowledge rather than encouraging analytical and critical thinking, and civic education tends more to convey patriotic images rather than strengthen civic skills, values, and attitudes such as active listening, empathy, solidarity, cooperation, social responsibility, and community engagement.

Survey results also showed that, in addition to general prejudice, populist attitudes – characterized by anti-elitism, scepticism of parliamentary democracy, and a desire for grass-roots decision-making – are the other most influential explanatory factor in all Visegrád

Citizenship education should not only emphasize passive but also active citizenship and involve both cognitive and emotive engagement.

countries for almost all types of antisemitism. Populism is directly related to “anomie expressed in political distrust, the feeling of being let down by leaders” (Kovács and Fischer 2021, 15). Additionally, developing populist attitudes is related to emotions and misinformation, thus civic education needs to go beyond promoting political participation and civic engagement to include both cognitive and emotive engagement (Pagliarello et al. 2021). For the cognitive dimension, critical thinking and media literacy are of great importance for making students resilient to misinformation. Furthermore, citizenship education should incorporate critical reflection on the emotional dimensions underlying populist attitudes, as well as the potential responses to those emotions (Ibid.).

HOLOCAUST EDUCATION AND REMEMBRANCE

To combat antisemitism, it is imperative to remember and teach about the Holocaust. The idea that Holocaust education and remembrance can counter antisemitism is widely accepted and institutionalized across Europe. When antisemitism is examined in the context of Nazi ideology, it provides insight into the manifestations and ramifications of prejudice, stereotyping, and antisemitism. Having knowledge about the Holocaust is also essential if individuals are to identify and reject Holocaust denial and distortion. However, Holocaust education and remembrance in certain cases could lead to secondary antisemitism, which is a reaction to feelings of guilt related to the Holocaust that challenges a sense of a positive national identity (Imhoff and Messer 2019).

Focus group research showed that many participants felt that the attention given to the Holocaust was disproportionate compared to that awarded to other historical events. Holocaust remembrance and education and questions of responsibility evoked a relatively large number of anti-Jewish remarks, especially in the Hungarian and Polish focus groups, ranging from

common anti-Jewish stereotypes to downplaying Jewish victimhood as a result of the Shoah or making false comparisons with other historical events.

There are some regional specificities that need to be noted here. One of the consequences of the region's historical trajectory is the prevalence of collective and competitive victimhood narratives in the region, especially in Hungary and Poland. Central and Eastern Europeans commonly perceive themselves as victims of both the Nazi and communist regimes, resulting in competing concepts of victimhood. Moreover, groups that were also victimized by the Nazi regime – although to different degrees – frequently dispute the extent to which Jews were victimized by the Holocaust “to preserve the unique character of the victimization of their own ingroups” (Bilewicz and Stefaniak, 2013). This may result in Holocaust trivialization or relativization. Competitive victimhood narratives are also employed by societies with a perpetrator history to absolve themselves of responsibility and guilt for past wrongdoings and restore their ingroup's moral identity (ibid.). Although competitive victimhood is not considered to be a completely independent determinant of antisemitism but rather a result of nationalism in a particular country, research found that competitive victimhood is correlated with stronger antisemitic attitudes in all four Visegrád countries.

In this region, victimhood is closely intertwined with the question of responsibility and how these societies perceive their role in World War II, especially during the Holocaust. In the survey, we examined how respondents viewed the actions of their societies during World War II in terms of bystander behaviour (Bilewicz and Babińska 2018). Conflict between people's perceptions of the Holocaust, motivated by the defence of the ingroup, may lead to antisemitism, as “the historical victim group threatens the validity of these representations” (Hirschberger et al. 2016, 34). Respondents' views of how their societies treated Jews during the Holocaust, which ranged from saving Jews to actively participating in the Holocaust, also correlated with antisemitism and Holocaust distortion, with significant country-level differences. Both in Hungary and Poland respondents who believed that their society had treated Jews positively were more likely to be antisemitic or to distort the Holocaust.⁹

Some of these research findings suggest that the extent to which Holocaust education and remembrance are effective at fostering resilience to antisemitism may depend greatly on the approach that is employed. Focusing exclusively on victims' experiences and teaching about the Holocaust in an accusatory manner may result in secondary antisemitism as well as victimhood competition (or at least competition over victimhood recognition), which may lead to further antisemitic feelings.

⁹ It should be noted that in Poland, both positive and negative perceptions correlated with stronger antisemitism, while in Slovakia these factors did not correlate with antisemitic views. Furthermore only negative historical perspectives are associated with antisemitism in the Czech samples: the more Czech respondents attribute negative behaviour to their societies during the Holocaust, the greater their likelihood of harbouring antisemitic attitudes.

As the UNESCO and OSCE/ODIHR *Addressing Anti-Semitism through Education: Guidelines for Policy Makers* report (2018) notes, it is important to discuss issues related to the Holocaust with students in a non-accusatory manner and to equip them with critical tools for dealing with contemporary forms of antisemitism. In addition to learning about the experiences of victims, it is important to examine the process by which society became exclusionary, as well as factors such as societal structures, economics, ideologies, personal convictions, and the motivational factors that influence human behaviour and which contributed to the Holocaust (ibid.). Regarding the use of terms such as “perpetrator,” “bystander,” “victim,” and “rescuer” in the context of the Holocaust, it is important to consider the guidelines provided in the *IHRA Recommendations for Teaching and Learning about the Holocaust* (2019).

IHRA Recommendations with regard to using the terms “perpetrator,” “bystander,” “victim,” and “rescuer.”

“Terms such as “perpetrator,” “bystander,” “victim” and “rescuer” have developed over time in Holocaust studies to classify and analyze particular types of historical actors. Ensure learners understand that these categories are imposed on the past rather than derived directly from it. Human behavior is usually overlapping and fluid: A person described as a “bystander” in one context may have been a “perpetrator” in another situation or even a “victim” in yet another. Take care to avoid reinforcing stereotypes that suggest that all rescuers were heroic, good, and kind, all bystanders were apathetic and all perpetrators were sadistic. Above all, underline that “victims” were not powerless but rather responding to difficult and stressful situations in ways conditioned by age, background and context. Particular care should be taken to ensure that easy generalizations about “national character” are avoided and are challenged if they arise.

The motivations of the perpetrators need to be studied in depth: Learners can use primary sources, case studies, and individual biographies to weigh the relative importance of factors. Societal structures, economics, ideology, prejudice, propaganda, xenophobia, dehumanization, peer pressure, criminal psychopathology and motivational factors such as fear, power or greed all played roles in decisions made by individuals to participate or become complicit in the Holocaust. The intent is not to normalize but to understand how humans came to do what they did. Understanding is not condoning.”

Source: IHRA Recommendations for Teaching and Learning about the Holocaust or Teaching and Learning about the Holocaust (2019)

Therefore, it is recommended that:

- *Cultural, awareness-raising, and educational programmes should promote knowledge of Jewish culture, traditions, diversity, and history, including that of the state of Israel and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, to enhance intercultural understanding. Curricula should reflect the diversity and complexity of the Jewish experience, as well as the positive contributions made by Jewish culture and individuals to society.*
- *Education and awareness-raising about the history and contemporary forms of antisemitism should be promoted. It is necessary to raise awareness regarding the fact that antisemitism today comes in both classical and new forms and can be expressed either directly and openly or more subtly. While it is important to acknowledge that antisemitism is part of a broader spectrum of prejudices directed at various groups, it is equally important to raise awareness regarding its distinctive characteristics, including the fact that it can take on different forms over time and fulfil various functions. Additionally, it is crucial to increase awareness about the centrality of its conspiracy nature and how it is common for Jews to be demonized in relation to other aspects of their identity, such as social status, professional background, and political ideology. Students should also be taught about the different social and political functions of antisemitism and how to respond to them.*
- *To be qualified to teach about antisemitism, teachers should receive adequate training, including guidance on how to respond effectively to challenging questions or behaviour from students when teaching them about antisemitism, and they should receive sufficient information about the history of antisemitism and its contemporary manifestations.*
- *Human rights education should provide a broader framework for addressing antisemitism through education. This should include 1) education about human rights, including minority rights; 2) education through human rights that ensures that educational settings respect the human rights of learners; and, 3) education for human rights that empowers students to exercise their rights and to promote and defend the rights of others.*
- *Educational programmes should advance citizenship education. Citizenship education should not only emphasize passive but also active citizenship, and should involve both cognitive and emotive engagement. This approach should foster a sense of social responsibility, advance critical thinking, develop media and information literacy skills, promote a debate culture, and develop an ability to challenge biased attitudes and prejudiced behaviour. Individuals should be socialised to develop respect for others, learn about solidarity, and realise that their contribution to the community matters, leading to a sense of social responsibility and agency. Additionally, citizenship education should*

incorporate critical reflection on the emotional dimensions underlying some of the attitudes that fuel antisemitism, as well as the potential responses to those emotions.

- *Awareness-raising and educational programmes should improve individuals' ability to comprehend the nature of virtual worlds and the impact of algorithms on spreading antisemitism and other hate messages.*
- *Education about the Holocaust should not exclusively focus on the experiences of the victims but also on the socio-historical processes that led to it, and their consequences for contemporary society. This should include examining the process by which society became exclusionary, as well as factors such as societal structures, economics, ideologies, personal convictions, and the motivational factors that influence human behaviour and which contributed to the Holocaust. Regarding the use of terms such as "perpetrator," "bystander," "victim," and "rescuer" in the context of the Holocaust, it is important to consider the guidelines provided in the IHRA Recommendations for Teaching and Learning about the Holocaust (2019).*
- *Education that focuses on addressing antisemitic stereotypes and prejudice, education about the Holocaust that focuses on both the experience of victims and socio-historical processes that led to it, and education about Jewish culture and history should be part of national curricula. Human rights education and citizenship education that promotes active citizenship and involves both cognitive and emotive dimensions should provide the broader framework for the educational system and national curricula. In addition, non-formal educational programmes that have these aims and are developed and implemented in accordance with relevant international guidelines should receive continuous institutional and financial support from the state.*
- *When remembering and teaching about the Holocaust and the events that preceded it, it is crucial to develop an understanding of the diversity of historical narratives and memory cultures and the reasons behind these narratives. Further, acknowledging the suffering of all Nazi victims is necessary, without underplaying, relativizing or minimizing historical Jewish suffering. It is also essential that societies address their overlapping victim and perpetrator roles in relation to the tragic events of the Second World War. It is vital that official policies for remembrance and education fully incorporate the perpetrator legacies of the state and society, including the role of bystanders. For that reason, an independent evaluation of school curricula concerning teaching about the Holocaust should be conducted involving experts, civil society, and the Jewish community, and their recommendations should be addressed.*
- *A permanent advisory body should be established, preferably within the ministry responsible for education and culture, on national remembrance policy*

that is composed of experts in various areas of remembrance policy, including representatives of Jewish and other victimized minority communities. Local self-governments should work with Jewish community representatives to plan events and programmes that contribute to local remembrance policy.

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